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RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS AND FATALITIES
IN CONSTRUCTION
Roland Zullo
Using state-level data, 2001 through 2009, I test whether union density and right-to-work (RTW) laws
predict worker fatalities in either the construction industry or in construction occupations. For both
indices, higher levels of unionization equate with lower fatality rates. Right-to-work laws show no direct
association with fatality rates. However, the interaction between RTW laws and unionization suggests
that unions are less effective at protecting member safety in right-to-work states. Overall the findings
support the hypothesis that RTW laws result in the underfunding of union safety training or accident
prevention programs.
One objective of organized labor is to protect worker safety and health.
Evidence can be found in the joint labor–management safety committees com-
monly established in unionized industrial sites, as well as in advocacy for effec-
tive Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards and
enforcement.
In terms of work fatalities, the construction industry is among the most
hazardous. A 1990 report by OSHA tallied anywhere from 800 to 1,200 con-
struction fatalities per year during the 1985–1989 period. The greatest number
of fatalities were due to a fall from an elevation (e.g., roof or scaffold), followed
by being struck by an object (e.g., heavy equipment), caught in or between
objects or material (e.g., trench cave-ins), and electrical shock. Together these
categories accounted for 90 percent of fatalities in the construction industry
(OSHA 1990). Labor unions in construction are sensitive to these risks, and
spend millions annually on safety training and accident prevention. Health and
safety agendas are encouraged at the national level, but programs are predomi-
nately funded and provided for at the state and local level.
In this research, I explore whether right-to-work (RTW) laws are related to
fatality rates in construction. Our hypothesis, which is based on collective action
theory, is that unions located in RTW states have fewer resources to devote to
safety training and accident prevention programs. I test that hypothesis by
assessing first if unionization or RTW laws are related to construction fatalities,
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and second, by estimating the interaction effect of these two factors. Three
specific questions are addressed:
1. In construction, is state-level unionization related to industry or occupa-
tional fatality rates?
2. In construction, are state RTW laws related to industry or occupational
fatality rates?
3. Is the estimated effect of unionization on fatalities conditional on RTW law?
The Right-to-Work Debate
Collective endeavors require resources. It matters little whether we are discuss-
ing the functions of a municipal government, a church, a labor union, or a
bowling league; resources, both volunteer and asset, are the lifeblood of any
organization. Virtually all collective endeavors are kept aloft in part through the
efforts of volunteers, but it is generally true that as organizations grow, so does
the need for assets. Financial assets become particularly necessary when the
organization expands to a point where equipment must be purchased, facilities
rented, and staff hired. As such, collective endeavors of reasonable size develop
mechanisms for marshalling financial assets. Governmental services rely on
taxation and user fees, places of worship pass the collection basket, labor unions
collect dues, clubs require membership fees, and so forth. An efficient method
for acquiring financial resources enables an organization to direct energy and
effort toward its core mission.
Nearly all of a labor union’s financial resources are provided by dues col-
lected from the workers they represent. In the field of labor–management
relations, provisions called “union security clauses” were invented to provide
labor unions with an efficient method of receiving union dues. Union security
clauses are contractual arrangements whereby management deducts union dues
from the paychecks of persons represented by the union and then remits the
monies to the union organization. Efficiencies arise in part from the automa-
tion of this task through the management payroll system, making it possible for
a union to avoid the time-consuming job of routinely requesting dues from
each person it represents. Efficiencies also arise from the ability of the parties
to negotiate terms that require all persons represented by the union to pay
dues.
It is the latter feature of union security that is the most controversial and
stands at the center of the RTW debate. In nearly every unionized workplace, a
number of represented persons will object to paying union dues. The rationale
varies, but a common objection is the use of dues for political purposes.1 In
non-RTW states, labor and management are allowed to negotiate a union
security clause that requires objectors to pay dues as a condition for keeping a
union job. In RTW states, union security clauses are prohibited, allowing dues
objectors to receive union representation without cost.
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The National Right to Work Foundation, which advocates for the passage
of RTW law, proclaims that it is “[d]efending America’s workers from the
abuses of compulsory unionism,” asserting that mandatory union dues violate
workers’ human or civil rights.2 While it is true that requiring dues from
objectors is coercive, one can readily dismiss such rhetoric as false moralism.3
The agenda of the National Right to Work Foundation is to constrict the
resources of labor unions by eliminating union security clauses. Under RTW,
objectors pay nothing, which results in a direct reduction in dues revenue.
Further, unions in RTW states must expend resources to continually organize
represented persons in order to sustain an active membership. By making the
task of collecting dues less effective and efficient, advocates for RTW under-
stand that organized labor has fewer resources for activities, such as political
advocacy and new member organizing. The intent of most RTW advocates, in
short, is not to defend the civil rights of individual workers, but to weaken the
labor movement.
Virtually all unions want the right to negotiate union security clauses
because it represents an effective and efficient method for collecting the finances
necessary to run their organizations. Unions rarely offer this explanation when
they publicly oppose RTW, but instead frame their argument as an affront to
shared sacrifice: with RTW, dues objectors enjoy the benefit of unionization
without paying anything toward the cost of negotiating and administering the
labor management contract.
At play is Mancur Olson’s (1965) economic-based theory on collective
action. Any organization producing a nonexcludable good4 must contend with
the classic collective action problem: how to finance organizational activities
when persons with access to the good have an incentive to refrain from contrib-
uting, thereby shifting a disproportionate burden of resourcing the organization
onto others. The existence of “freeriders”—persons that enjoy the good without
contributing—reduces resources, causing the organization to underperform in
its objectives. And by increasing the cost burden for persons that do contribute,
freeriders decrease the likelihood of organizational formation and hasten orga-
nizational extinction.
Union representation in the workplace is a nonexcludable good, since by law
all persons in a bargaining unit, both members and objectors, are entitled to the
rights and benefits of a labor agreement.5 For organized labor, RTW laws
exacerbate the collective action problem by allowing persons benefitting from
union representation to refrain from paying toward its cost. Consistent with
Olson’s theory, unions are generally weaker in states with RTW laws.
Published reviews of RTW research have focused on how RTW laws affect
union member growth, worker compensation, union–nonunion wage differen-
tials, and industry location (Moore 1998; Moore and Newman 1985). All of
these issues are important to labor unions, employers, and policymakers. In this
research, we broaden the discussion by examining the effects of RTW on
workplace safety. Using publically available data, we explore the possibility that
RTW laws affect worker safety in the construction industry.
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Data and Analysis
Data for this analysis were obtained from several sources. Construction
fatality data are from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), and Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). Construc-
tion employment data are from the DOL, BLS, Quarterly Census of Employ-
ment and Wages (QCEW). Union member figures were compiled from the
labor management reports archived by the DOL, Office of Labor Management
Standards (OLMS).6 Construction gross domestic product (GDP) is from the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All data
are annual, state-level figures. From these data, two ratios were produced as
dependent measures:
1. construction industry fatalities per thousand construction employees; and
2. construction occupation fatalities per thousand construction employees.
The difference between the two ratios is in the numerator. The former
counts fatalities in the construction industry, which can include persons who are
not usually members of the building trades (e.g., drivers); the latter counts
fatalities in construction occupations, which includes persons in the building
trades that are not employed in the construction industry (e.g., local govern-
ment). The industry fatality data was available for years 2001–2009. The occu-
pation fatality data includes years 2003–2009. Table 1 gives the averages on these
measures for RTW and non-RTW states.
For both measures, the fatality rate is higher in RTW states: 40 percent
higher for industry fatalities and 34 percent higher for occupational fatalities.
These statistics alone, however, fall short of testing whether RTW law is
responsible for elevated fatality rates, because RTW laws are found predomi-
nately in the southern and western U.S., and it might be that other factors,
such as geographic terrain, weather, and so forth, affect worker safety. More-
over, unions have a stronger presence in non-RTW states, and these summary
statistics do not adjust for differences in collective representation across the
states.
Critical for our study, these aggregate statistics do not test our hypothesis
that RTW laws limit the ability for unions in the construction industry to fund
effective safety training and accident prevention programs. To bring evidence to
bear on this question, a multivariate analysis is needed that includes union
density and other state controls. The following measures are used:
Table 1. Mean Fatality Statistics, RTW, and Non-RTW States
RTW Non-RTW
Industry fatalities per thousand employees 0.196 0.140
Occupation fatalities per thousand employees 0.126 0.094
RTW, right to work.
228 WORKINGUSA: THE JOURNAL OF LABOR AND SOCIETY
Union Density = Trades union members/employees in construction
RTW = Indicator for whether the state has a right to work law
GDP per Employee = Construction GDP/employees in construction
Building Construction = Building construction employees/employees in
construction
Heavy/Civil Engineering = Heavy/civil engineering employees/employees
in construction
State Plan = Indicator for states with an OSHA—approved health and safety
program
Union Density and RTW are the major independent variables that will be
used to predict fatalities, while the other variables are controls. GDP per
Employee controls for industry productivity. Building Construction (NAICS
236) and Heavy/Civil Engineering (NAICS 237) are ratios that control for the
type of construction activity. It is expected that these ratios will be positively
associated with fatalities, because the omitted group, Specialty Trade Contrac-
tors (NAICS 238), are less likely to use heavy equipment or involve working
on tall, open structures. Finally, year variables are included to factor out time
trends.
Industry and occupation fatality rates are modeled as a function of union
density, RTW, and controls. I include these variables in a multivariate regression
with a random effects estimator that adjusts for correlated error within each
state.
Multivariate Results
Table 2 presents the multivariate results for industry fatalities.
In Model 1, the regression coefficient for union density (b = -0.121) is
statistically significant and negatively associated with fatalities. This finding is
consistent with the view that unions act to protect member safety (i.e., higher
Table 2. Predictors of Fatalities in the Construction Industry, 2001–2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Union Density -0.121** (0.066) -0.351*** (0.118)
RTW -0.050 (0.125) 0.122 (0.255)
RTW ¥ Union Density 0.270* (0.158)
GDP per Employee 0.033 (0.226) -0.158 (0.225) 0.144 (0.228)
Building Construction 3.642** (1.433) 2.852 (1.519) 3.481** (1.445)
Heavy/Civil Engineering 1.054 (0.973) 1.028 (1.017) 1.460 (0.963)
State Plan -0.269** (0.114) -0.279** (0.119) -0.254** (0.110)
Year -0.006 (0.010) -0.001 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010)
Constant 3.488 (20.987) -7.241 (20.802) 10.304 (21.021)
R2 0.168 0.135 0.201
N observations 459 459 459
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
RTW, right to work.
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union density equals higher safety). Because both the union density variable and
the fatality ratio are in logarithmic form, the coefficient is easy to interpret. A 1
percent increase in union density equates with a 0.12 percent decline in the
industry fatality ratio.
Model 2 looks at RTW, controlling for other factors. The RTW coefficient
is negative, but fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The
conclusion therefore is no association between RTW and industry fatalities.
Model 3 includes union density, RTW, and an interaction term for these
measures. This technique allows for a test of whether the union density effect
observed in Model 1 is conditional on RTW. And indeed, results suggest that the
estimated effect union density has on reducing fatalities does depend on state
RTW laws. The regression coefficient for union density (b = -0.351) indicates
that a 1 percent increase in union density in non-RTW states equates with a 0.35
percent decline in the industry fatality ratio. Meanwhile, the regression coeffi-
cients for RTW (b = 0.122) and the interaction term (b = 0.270) are both posi-
tive, which essentially nullifies the union density effect. Thus, unions appear to
have a positive role in reducing construction industry fatalities, but only in states
without RTW laws. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 1.
On the Y-axis are the estimated construction industry fatality rates (per
thousand employees). On the X-axis are low and high union density levels,
defined as 1 standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively, for
RTW and non-RTW states. The solid line represents the difference in con-
struction industry fatality rates in non-RTW states under conditions of low and
high levels of building trade union density. Similarly, the dashed line represents
fatality rates for low and high levels of building trades unions, but in RTW
states.
Figure 1 illustrates the relative effectiveness of unions in non-RTW states.
In non-RTW states, industry fatalities are 0.23 per thousand, with low levels of
Figure 1. Construction Industry Fatality Rates per Thousand Employees.
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union density, but this estimate drops to 0.16 with high union density. By
comparison, the industry fatality rates in RTW states are relatively flat regard-
less of the level of industry unionization: with low levels of unions, the fatality
rate is 0.20; with high levels, the rate is 0.18. Labor unions, according to these
results, are less effective at reducing fatalities in RTW states.
To cross-validate the construction industry results, fatality rates for persons
in construction occupations were analyzed. Table 3 presents the results, with
models arranged in the same order as the industry fatality analysis.
Overall, the occupation fatality results corroborate the industry results.
Model 1 indicates that a 1 percent increase in union density is associated with a
0.22 percent decline in the ratio of occupation fatalities. This estimated effect
applies across all states and the District of Columbia.
Model 2 provides no evidence of an association between RTW and occupa-
tion fatalities. Model 3, however, again suggests an interaction between union
density and RTW. In states without RTW laws, a 1 percent increase in union
density equates with a 0.58 percent decline in the occupation fatality ratio. This
positive effect on worker safety is greatly reduced in states with RTW laws.
Figure 2 plots the relationships.
Figure 2 depicts a noticeable difference in fatality rates between low- and
high-union density conditions in non-RTW states, but for RTW states, the
difference is less significant. In non-RTW states, the construction occupation
fatality rates with low union density are about double the fatality rate with high
union density: estimated at 0.22 per thousand compared with 0.11 per thousand.
In RTW states, the range is between 0.18 and 0.14 per thousand for low and
high unionization densities, respectively.
Another notable finding in this analysis was the reduction in fatalities attrib-
uted to states having their own department for regulating health and safety. The
industry fatality rate was about 25 percent lower for states with such a plan, and
the occupational fatality rate was 30 percent lower. We speculate that this
Table 3. Predictors of Fatalities in Construction Occupations, 2003–2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Union Density -0.223* (0.093) -0.597*** (0.162)
RTW -0.082 (0.174) 0.168 (0.359)
RTW ¥ Union Density 0.430* (0.218)
GDP per Employee 0.171 (0.320) -0.149 (0.316) 0.362 (0.318)
Building Construction 7.428** (2.075) 5.957** (2.233) 7.123** (2.069)
Heavy/Civil Engineering 1.990 (1.405) 2.177 (1.478) 2.648 (1.355)
State Plan -0.318* (0.157) -0.331* (0.164) -0.298* (0.147)
Year 0.009 (0.018) 0.013 (0.018) 0.005 (0.018)
Constant -29.263 (37.003) -37.378 (37.164) -19.350 (36.830)
R2 0.233 0.198 0.280
N observations 357 357 357
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
RTW, right to work.
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reflects the relative advantage for state officials in collaborating with industry
and union leaders to prevent accidents.
Policy Implications and Future Research
This research set out to explore whether RTW laws interfere with the ability
of unions in the building trades to protect member safety. Using collective action
theory, I hypothesized that RTW laws result in the underfunding of safety
training or accident prevention programs, and that this effect manifests as higher
fatality rates. We explored this hypothesis by examining industry and occupation
fatality rates in the fifty states and the District of Columbia over the 2001–2009
period. Our empirical test attempted to determine, first, whether unionism was
associated with lower fatality rates, and, second, whether the association
between unionism and fatality rates was conditional on the presence of RTW
laws.
The results support the hypothesis. Construction unionization is associated
with lower industry and occupation fatality rates. Moreover, the positive effect
that unions have on reducing fatalities appears to be stronger in states without
RTW laws.
Several states are currently considering adopting RTW laws. These results
call for policymakers to include in their deliberations the potential negative
effect of RTW law on worker health and safety. Passing RTW laws may have the
unintended consequence of elevating workplace fatalities. States attempting to
reduce construction-related fatalities might instead consider encouraging trade
union growth and repealing RTW laws.
These results are preliminary, and further analysis is recommended. A more
refined study would be to test for effects at the individual or incident level. An
Figure 2. Construction Occupation Fatalities per Thousand Employees.
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alternative approach might involve the collection of data on union safety train-
ing or accident prevention activities to assess whether there are differences
across RTW and non-RTW regions.
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1. Current law allows political objectors in all fifty states to receive a rebate on their dues payment commen-
surate with the amount of dues money spent by the union in politics.
2. See: National Right to Work Foundation at http://www.nrtw.org/.
3. If free association for workers were indeed the charter of the National Right to Work Foundation, then they
would expend equal fervor toward changing labor law to punish employers that obstruct the free association
(i.e., unionization) of employees. Or even more genuine would be an endorsement of the idea of minority
unions (bargaining rights for groups of workers with less than 50 percent membership at a worksite), which
eminent labor law scholar Charles Morris (2005) shows was the original intent and practice of U.S. labor
law.
4. “Nonexcludable good” refers to products or services that, once developed, can be broadly accessed or
enjoyed by persons who had no role in creating or financing the good.
5. One could carry this argument further by asserting that union advocacy in the political arena, on issues such
as minimum wages or workplace safety, produces a nonexcludable good for a large segment of society.
6. The numbers of union members were derived by summing the local membership figures in each state for
the following building trades: Bricklayers (BAC), Boilermakers (BBF), Carpenters (CJA), Electrical
Workers (IBEW), Elevator Constructors (IUEC), Operating Engineers (IUOE), Heat and Frost Insulators
(HFIA), Laborers (LIUNA), Painters (PAT), Plasterers and Cement Masons (OPCM), Plumbers (PPF),
Roofers (RWAW), Sheet Metal Workers (SMW).
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Appendix
Table A1. Data Measures, Source, and Statistics
Measure Source Mean (SD)
All states RTW states Non-RTW states
Construction industry fatalities per
construction employee
CFOI1 -8.562 (0.635) -8.571 (0.493) -8.555 (0.726)
Construction occupation fatalities per
construction employee
CFOI1 -8.757(0.866) -8.803(0.713) -8.723(0.967)
Building trades union members per
construction employee
OLMS1 -1.262(0.806) -1.874(0.664) -0.799(0.557)
Construction GDP per construction
employee
BEA1 -2.604(0.228) -2.680(0.152) -2.546(0.258)
Building construction employees per
total construction employees
QCEW 0.236(0.033) 0.224(0.027) 0.245(0.035)
Heavy/civic engineering employees
per total construction employees
QCEW 0.173(0.054) 0.192(0.061) 0.158(0.043)
States with approved occupational
health and safety plans
DOL 0.490(0.500) 0.409(0.493) 0.552(0.498)
Note: 1Measure in logarithmic form.
CFOI, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries; OLMS; Office of Labor-Management Standards; BEA, Bureau
of Economic Analysis; QCEW, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; DOL, Department of Labor
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